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The use of choice as a mechanism to improve public service delivery is now well 
established  in  the  UK.  Current  policy  discourse  additionally  considers  voice  as  a 
further,  user-driven  mechanism.  Moreover,  choice  and  voice  are  considered  to  be 
complementary,  as  these  quotes  from  a  recent  Prime  Minister’s  Strategy  Unit 
discussion paper illustrate: “Choice and voice should complement each other.” …. 
“Bottom-up pressure through choice and voice can … give everyone, including the 
disadvantaged, better quality services” (PMSU 2006, page 10). This discourse about 
choice  and  voice  working  together  to  improve  quality  can  be  traced  back  to 
Hirschman  (1970),  who  argues  that  exit  (choice)  and  voice  are  two  consumer 
responses to deterioration in the quality of a firm’s product or service
1. These provide 
signals to the firm, which responds by improving quality, thereby  creating a self-
correcting mechanism via which quality standards are maintained. Hirschman argues 
that  different  combinations  of  exit  and/or  voice  are  suitable  in  different  settings, 
depending on which signal(s) the firm is most responsive to. 
 
Bottom-up pressure is just one of four elements of the UK government framework for 
improving  quality  in  public  service  delivery  (PMSU  2006).  The  model  of  public 
service  reform  also  incorporates  top-down  performance  management, 
competition/contestability,  and  increasing  the  capability  and  capacity  of  public 
servants. It is recognised that this general model needs to be tailored to each service; 
in particular “The appropriate mix of top-down pressure, competition and bottom-up 
choice and voice will therefore vary from case to case” (PMSU 2006, page 11). 
 
The current English education system provides one clear example of these different 
elements  in  operation
2.  Parental  choice  is  emphasised  as  a  key  driver  to  improve 
quality, with parents also encouraged to make their voices heard (via parent councils 
and  parent  governorships,  for  example).  Parental  choice  is  informed  by  school 
performance  tables  and  Ofsted  reports,  which  form  part  of  the  ‘top-down’ 
performance management regime in which schools have targets based on published 
student  outcomes.  Schools  in  England  compete  for  pupils  in  order  to  maintain 
numbers  and  therefore  levels  of  funding,  and  new  entry  into  the  market  –  by 
Academies, for example – is being encouraged. The government’s commitment to 
improving  the  capability  and  capacity  of  the  education  sector  workforce  can  be 
illustrated by the formation of the Training and Development Agency for Schools 
(TDA) in September 2005
3. The aim is for all these elements to combine to create a 
“self-improving system”, providing high quality education for all pupils.  
 
In this paper I investigate one aspect of this general reform programme in the context 
of education. Specifically, I scrutinise the assumption that choice (exit) and voice do 
                                                 
1 In this paper I use the terms exit and choice interchangeably, as does most of the literature. I think 
there are interesting issues regarding whether it is actually exit or entry that is driving choice, but save 
this for future work (see, however, Teske et al (1993)). Also in this paper I do not emphasise the 
consequences of considering different types of exit or voice (Dowding and John (2008), nor do I 
address the ‘consumer versus citizen’ debate as recently discussed by Greener (2007)). 
2 The systems are different in each of the countries of the UK; here I focus only on England. 
3 The TDA was formed from the merger of the Teacher Training Agency and the National Remodelling 
Team; more details at www.tda.gov.uk.  3 
complement  each  other  in  creating  user-driven  incentives  to  increase  quality  of 
education provision for all. I do this by going back to Hirschman’s original thesis, 
focussing in particular on the implications of the definitions of ‘quality’ put forward 
by him. I apply his analysis to the English education context and show that, while the 
current policy discourse evokes the language of Hirschman, it doesn’t follow through 
on the actual implications of his analysis. In particular, I argue that in the current 
system, choice and voice may complement each other for only a subset of consumers. 
 
 
Hirschman’s exit, voice, loyalty and quality 
 
Hirschman (1970) argues that a process of decline in the quality of a firm’s output 
(for  whatever  reason)  activates  certain  consumer  responses  which  in  turn  act  as 
endogenous forces of recovery, thereby reversing the initial decline in quality. This is 
a self-correction mechanism, whereby the very process of decline activates certain 
counterforces  and  hence  generates  its  own  cure.  He  distinguishes  two  contrasting 
consumer  responses  –  exit  and  voice.  Exit  is  “the  sort  of  mechanism  economics 
thrives on” (ibid page 15). It is neat, impersonal and indirect: subsequent recovery by 
the firm comes via the market. Voice, by contrast, is more “messy”, more personal 
and more direct, and can cover anything from personal complaint to collective action. 
Hirschman’s particular interest is how, and under what circumstances, exit and voice 
may combine to best rectify or reverse a (relative or absolute) decline in quality of a 
firm’s product or service:  
 
…. “how a typical market mechanism and a typical non-market, political mechanism 
work side by side, possibly in harmony and mutual support, possibly also in such a 
fashion that one gets into the other’s way and undercuts its effectiveness” (Hirschman 
1970, page 18).  
 
To be effective, he argues, the signal used – exit or voice – should correspond with 
that to which the organisation is responsive, which in turn depends on the particular 
service/product  and/or  organisation  being  considered
4.  He  identifies  a  particular 
problem, however: that over-emphasis on less costly exit may reduce investment in 
(may ‘atrophy’) voice, even in circumstances when voice may be the most effective 
mechanism for improving quality. This is because those consumers who care most 
about quality – and who would be the most active agents of voice – are for that very 
reason those most likely to exit first when faced with a decline in that quality. If the 
firm is more responsive to voice, this will make the self-correction mechanism less 
effective at restoring levels of quality. Hirschman recognises a tension between exit 
and voice: consumers’ willingness to develop and use the voice mechanism is reduced 
by exit, but the presence of an exit option increases the effectiveness of voice.  
 
One way in which exit, particularly by quality-sensitive consumers, may be delayed is 
through what Hirschman calls loyalty: “The importance of loyalty … is that it can 
neutralize within certain limits the tendency of the most quality-conscious customers 
or  members  to  be  the  first  to  exit”  (page  79).  Loyalty  is  psychological,  not 
behavioural (Dowding et al 2000), and can be understood in terms of a generalised 
                                                 
4 I shall argue later that the responsiveness of the organisation to different signals depends at least 
partly on the incentives created by the top-down system within which the organisation operates (Paul 
1992). 4 
barrier  to  exit  which  may  be  directly  imposed  or  internally  generated.  Hirschman 
argues  that  staying  within  a  declining  organisation  may  in  fact  be  rational  if,  by 
exiting, the quality of the organisation further declines, and the consumer cares about 
the quality of the organisation even after s/he’s left it
5. This in turn implies s/he does 
not fully exit (“voice from within” compared to “voice from without”). Hirschman 
introduces the term “quality maker” to describe that situation where a consumer’s exit 
causes quality to further decline, a term to which I shall refer in my application of his 
analysis to the education context
6. 
 
Hirschman (1970) identifies two scenarios with regard to quality. The majority of his 
analysis draws on the assumption that a change in quality is felt in the same direction 
by all consumers: individuals may be differentially sensitive to such a change, but all 
agree that it is either a decline or an improvement. In the analysis that follows, I will 
additionally use the term ‘uni-dimensional’ quality to describe this scenario: quality 
can  improve  or  decline  only  along  one  dimension,  and,  as  with  Hirschman, 
individuals  all  agree  on  the  direction  of  change  along  that  dimension.  Hirschman 
more briefly considers the case when a change in quality is felt in different directions 
by different consumers: individuals may disagree on whether an increase in the level 
of a particular service is a good or a bad thing depending on their political affiliations, 
for  example.  I  introduce  the  term  ‘multi-dimensional’  quality  to  describe  this 
scenario, where the preferences of consumers differ across alternative dimensions and 
hence  they  may  disagree  whether  changes  along  any  one  dimension  represent  a 
decline  or  improvement  in  quality.  Hirschman’s  quality  distinction  parallels  that 
between  vertical  and  horizontal  product  differentiation  in  the  economics  literature 
(Gaynor  2006).  With  vertical  product  differentiation  (‘product  quality’),  all 
consumers have the same preferences and so agree that some products are better than 
others.  With  horizontal  product  differentiation  (‘product  variety’),  consumers  can 
have differing preferences and thus some may like one product while others prefer 
another. In the analysis that follows I will use these terms interchangeably. Crucially, 
Hirschman shows that the operation of exit and/or voice yields different outcomes 
depending  on  which  concept  of  quality  is  relevant.  I  briefly  describe  the  relevant 
features  of  the  English  education  sector  before  applying  Hirschman’s  concepts  of 
quality to that context and investigating the resultant predicted outcomes. 
 
 
The English education sector 
 
Parental choice of school has been a feature of the English education system since 
1989. This is ‘generalised but differential’ choice (Burgess et al 2007): all parents 
express a choice of the preferred school for their child, but the extent to which that 
preference  is  realised  varies  across  the  country  (see  Burgess  et  al  (2006)  for  a 
quantitative  analysis  of  the  outcomes  of  the  current  system).  The  choices  –  or 
preferences –  are informed by in-depth Ofsted reports on individual schools, plus 
annually  published  school  performance  (league)  tables.  Until  2002  the  published 
performance  measures  provided  summary  information  on  raw  test  scores  –  the 
                                                 
5 François (2000; 2001) analyses the effects of individuals placing a value on the quality of service 
provided even though they do not directly receive personal benefit. His focus is on how such ‘care’ 
impacts on employee motivation in the provision of public services.  
6 The concepts of quality maker and taker parallel those of price maker and taker with regard to 
(im)perfect competition. 5 
proportion of pupils gaining at least five ‘good’ GCSE passes, for example. Currently 
these raw outcome measures are still published, but now along with information on 
the ‘contextual value added’ (CVA) provided by the school (Wilson and Piebalga 
2008). CVA aims to provide a better measure of the actual impact of the school on 
pupil  progress,  i.e.  its  effectiveness,  by  accounting  for  factors  that  are  known  to 
impact on pupil attainment but which are outside the school’s control. The aim is that 
parental choice acts as a driver for schools to improve ‘quality’; I return to what that 
means below.  
 
Alongside choice, parents are encouraged to exercise voice in the education system in 
a number of ways. At an individual level via the personalisation of the curriculum 
agenda (PMSU 2006; Strategy Unit 2008) as well as getting involved in the running 
of  the  school  through  becoming  a  parent  governor  or  a  member  of  the  Parents 
Teachers  Association  (PTA).  Parents  are  also  able  to  make  complaints  about  the 
education their child is receiving, although in practice it may be difficult for parents to 
do this (Vincent and Martin 2002)
7. There are also options for collective voice in this 
system, through parent councils, for example, as well as parents acting together to get 
a new school built, or trying to stop an existing school being closed.  
 
I  distinguish  three  key  players  or  agents  in  this  education  ‘market’.  First  are  the 
parents,  who  are  the  ‘consumers’  of  education,  able  to  show  their  concern  about 
quality by exercising choice and/or voice
8. Second are the schools, which need to be 
responsive to such signals in order that quality improves. Finally, the government is 
responsible  for  the  top-down  system  of  performance  management,  which  creates 
particular incentives for schools via, for example, the targets they face, and within 
which the system of parental choice operates (Wilson et al 2006). 
 
So what is ‘quality’ in this context? As Le Grand (2007) discusses, there are many 
possible meanings of quality in the context of public services. He distinguishes four 
alternative  means  by  which  quality  can  be  defined:  inputs;  process;  outputs; 
outcomes.  While  “raising  the  overall  quality  of  a  school  system  is  perhaps  the 
principal objective of any such educational policy” (ibid, page 64), in practice most 
empirical  attention  is  usually  focused  on  measuring  quality  through  educational 
inputs, and/or on one interpretation of outcomes: the standards of  achievement as 
measured  by  test  results.  This  outcomes  interpretation  of  quality  links  to  the 
definitions of quality I employ in this paper, informed by the distinctions made by 
Hirschman. Specifically, I distinguish quality as effectiveness, or ‘value added’, from 
quality as the basis for parental choice.  
 
First,  quality  as  effectiveness,  or  ‘value  added’.  I  argue  that  this  is  closest  to  the 
government aim of improving actual school performance – the impact schools have 
on the progress of all their pupils. I also argue that this corresponds to Hirschman’s 
notion of a change in quality being felt in the same direction by all consumers (what I 
call  uni-dimensional  quality),  i.e.  that  all  consumers  see  an  increase  in  school 
                                                 
7 Many parents of course voice their dissatisfaction when they appeal against their child not getting a 
place at their preferred school, which illustrates one of the interesting dynamic processes between 
choice and voice (Dowding et al 2000; Dowding and John 2008).  
8 I acknowledge that children are also part of the decision-making process regarding choice of preferred 
school, but abstract from the issues around the family dynamics of such processes for the purpose of 
this analysis. 6 
effectiveness as an improvement. As Le Grand (2007) states, however, the emphasis 
has not been on value added performance measures; rather it has been on outcomes as 
measured by test results and proxied, for example, by the 5AC performance measure. 
This is still the basis for the headline figures in league tables; the key measures of 
‘quality’ used both in the top-down performance management regime and to inform 
bottom-up  parental  choice.  How  does  this  link  with  Hirschman’s  analysis?  Any 
measure of raw output includes information on the pupils as well as on the school 
performance;  on  its  composition  as  well  as  its  effectiveness.  In  other  words  such 
measures  include  the  pupil  as  an  input  as  well  as  an  output  to  the  education 
production process: for example, high ability pupils will produce high scores on raw 
output  measures,  all  other  things  being  equal.  This  links  directly  to  Hirschman’s 
concept of a quality maker.  
 
Second,  quality  as  the  basis  for  parental  choice.  While  academic  standards  are 
important to parents (West and Pennell 1999; Coldron and Boulton 1991), there is 
evidence to suggest that parents do not choose their preferred school solely on the 
basis of league table information (test scores or value added). Rothstein (2004), for 
example,  finds  that  school  effectiveness  is  not  a  primary  determinant  of  parental 
decisions
9, while Reay and Lucey (2003) find that it is how similar children perform 
at a school that matter more than overall school averages. Butler and Robson’s (2003) 
study shows that performance tables are not the sole arbiter of the parental choice 
decision, and that the ethos of the school also matters. Ball et al (1995) similarly 
discuss the importance of the ‘expressive order’ of a school. School composition is a 
further dimension that matters to parents, possibly in different ways. Ball and Vincent 
(1998) argue that many parents feel strongly that it is important to keep their child 
with children from the same social and/or ethnic group, while Jellison Holme’s (2002) 
US  study  suggests  that  the  most  coveted  schools  for  privileged  parents  are  those 
without low-income or minority ethnic students. Several studies show how parental 
preferences vary by income, ethnicity and/or socio-economic background (see, for 
example, Hastings et al (2005); Gerwitz et al (1995); Weekes-Bernard (2007)). It is 
sometimes  not  clear  whether  a  parent’s  stated  preference  represents  choice  or 
constraint  (Reay  and  Lucey  2003);  the  importance  of  the  location  of  the  school 
provides one example of this. The key point from this for the current analysis is that 
parents have different preferences across the various aspects of school quality, which 
means that individuals may disagree whether changes in specific dimensions of this 




Applying Hirschman’s concepts of quality to the education context 
 
(a) A change in quality is felt in the same direction by all: uni-dimensional quality 
 
The assumption that a change in quality is felt in the same direction by all consumers 
underlies much of Hirschman’s analysis. In this case, consumers agree on whether a 
change  is  an  improvement  or  a  decline  in  quality,  but  they  may  be  differentially 
sensitive to such change. If quality declines, exit and voice are complementary in the 
                                                 
9 Rothstein analyses parental residential location decisions as part of a system of Tiebout choice in the 
US. 7 
sense that they both work to improve quality, as long as the signal used is that to 
which the organisation is responsive. There are spillovers or externalities between 
alert and inalert consumers: the latter benefit from the quality improvement brought 
about  the  exit  or  voice  of  the  former  precisely  because  they  all  see  it  as  an 
improvement. 
 
These  results  have  parallels  with  the  theoretical  predictions  from  the  economics 
literature on vertical product differentiation when prices are regulated (Gaynor 2006). 
If prices are regulated, firms compete for consumers on non-price dimensions. Under 
the  assumption  of  vertical  product  differentiation,  competition  unambiguously 
increases quality, although not necessarily to the social welfare maximising level. If 
voice works in the same direction as exit, the introduction of voice should not alter 
this broad finding: an increase in exit and/or voice leads to an increase in ‘product 
quality’ if prices are regulated. 
 
As discussed above, however, the presence of exit may reduce investment in voice: 
exit may atrophy voice. The most quality-sensitive, and therefore the potentially most 
vocal, are likely to be the first to exit, leaving behind less vocal consumers. This is a 
problem  if  the  organisation  is  more  responsive to  voice,  as  the  signal  it  needs  to 
improve  quality  will  be  weaker  and  the  self-correction  mechanism  therefore  less 
effective.  
 
So if a quality change is felt in the same direction by all consumers, Hirschman argues 
that  exit  and  voice  are  complementary  and  there  are  spillovers  between  alert  and 
inalert consumers, but there is the potential for over-emphasis on exit even when the 
firm more responsive to voice, which may prevent or delay recovery. 
 
Application to the English education sector 
 
Consider quality as school effectiveness, or value added, an improvement in which, I 
argue, is felt as such by all consumers
10. In this case, the Hirschman thesis suggests 
that  exit  and  voice  will  indeed  be  complementary;  that  both  these  user-driven 
mechanisms will work together to provide signals to the schools to improve their 
effectiveness. The actions of the alert will cause spillovers for the inalert consumers, 
as all benefit from the agreed-upon improvement. This sounds very much like the 
“rising tide that raises all boats” scenario of Hoxby (2003), which reflects the result 
from the economics literature that ‘product quality’ increases with competition. 
 
But  what  about  the  problem  of  exit  atrophying  voice?  Hirschman  argues  that  the 
possibility of exit reduces investment in voice, and that the most vocal exit first which 
leaves less scope for effective voice. This is not a problem, however, if schools are 
more responsive to the exit signal than to voice. The degree of responsiveness of 
schools to different user signals is determined by the incentives they face, i.e. by the 
design of the performance management regime within which choice and voice operate 
(Paul 1992). There is therefore a fundamental link between the bottom-up and top-
down elements of the system. The current system in England, in which school funding 
relies directly on pupil numbers, is one in which school incentives are based more on 
                                                 
10 Consumers may not all feel this improvement to the same degree: the evidence suggests that schools 
exhibit differential effectiveness across the ability distribution, for example (Wilson and Piebalga 2008; 
Thomas 2001; Goldstein and Thomas 1996). 8 
choice than on voice, so atrophy should not be a problem: the top-down performance 
management system creates the incentive for schools to respond to the choice signal. 
One implication of this, however, is that if policy makers are attempting to introduce 
more options for voice as an additional user-driven mechanism alongside choice, they 
need to also create the incentives for schools to respond to that signal, and to respond 
by improving their effectiveness
11.  
 
So  if  all  the  key  players  are  (only)  interested  in  quality  as  value  added  or 
effectiveness,  the  Hirschman  analysis  concurs  with  current  policy  discourse  in 
predicting that choice and voice should complement one another in improving quality 
for all. The design of the performance management system is central to the relative 
degree of responsiveness of schools to the two signals.  
 
(b) A change in quality is felt in different directions by different consumers: quality is 
‘multi-dimensional’. 
 
The evidence suggests, however, that parents are not only interested in the measures 
of school performance that are published in league tables (value added or raw test 
scores). Parents take  account of a much broader, more multi-dimensional view of 
quality when choosing the preferred school(s) for their children. Moreover, different 
aspects of the school environment matter to varying degrees across parents. Again, we 
turn to Hirschman and then apply his analysis to the education context.  
 
Hirschman considers the case when a change in quality is not appreciated as such by 
all  consumers,  i.e.  when  consumers  have  a  differential  appreciation  of  the  same 
quality  change.  He  gives  the  example  of  different  political  affiliations  leading  to 
differing views regarding changes in local government spending. I argue that we can 
similarly think in terms of quality being multi-dimensional: a change in quality along 
one dimension may be appreciated by some but not by others. In such a scenario, 
Hirschman argues, organisations have the possibility of changing quality in such a 
way as to please some while displeasing others. Which route will they take? To whom 
will they respond? 
 
It  proves  useful  to  first  consider  the  predictions  from  the  theoretical  economics 
literature.  The  relevant  scenario  is  still  one  of  regulated  prices,  but  now  with 
horizontal product differentiation (‘product variety’). In a recent review of this area, 
however, Gaynor (2006) does not consider this scenario. He focuses solely on vertical 
product  differentiation  because  “it  is  well  know  that  firms  will  pursue  minimal 
product  variety  in  the  absence  of  price  competition”  (page  9).  This  result  comes 
originally  from  Hotelling  (1929)  who  showed  that,  under  certain  conditions,  it  is 
rational for firms to make their products as similar as possible. In particular this result 
depends on the assumption of zero elasticity of demand for the firms’ products along 
the linear market. Under this assumption consumers will continue to buy the product 
from their nearest firm, regardless of how near it is. The incentive for the two profit 
maximising firms is therefore to locate at the centre, i.e. produce the same product, 
and thus capture half the market.  
 
                                                 
11 There is a large literature on how public service providers may respond to signals, and targets more 
generally, in unintended and potentially undesirable ways (see, for example, Smith 1995; Propper and 
Wilson 2003).  9 
As  Hirschman  (1970)  points  out,  however,  horizontal  product  differentiation  with 
regulated prices is a common empirical reality
12. One explanation may come from 
relaxing the assumption that demand is inelastic. If demand is elastic each firm would 
lose customers at its own end of the market as it moved towards the centre and this 
provides the incentive for firms to maintain some degree of product differentiation (to 
stay away from the centre). An alternative explanation offered by Hirschman involves 
voice.  As  he  states  (1970,  page  70,  italics  in  original):  “inelastic  demand  at  the 
extremes of the linear market can spell considerable influence via voice”. Firms faced 
with  both  exit  and  voice  signals  may  need  to  trade  off  profit  maximisation  with 
discontent minimisation, which may provide an incentive not to cluster at the centre 
of the linear market.  
 
There  are  no  specific  predictions,  however,  arising  from  the  Hirschman  analysis 
regarding the outcomes with horizontal product differentiation and regulated prices in 
the presence of both exit and voice. Rather, Hirschman discusses in general terms the 
‘quality path’ of the organisation, and how this path depends on its responsiveness to 
exit  and/or  voice.  For  example,  if  it  is  more  responsive  to  exit  than  voice,  the 
organisation  is  more  likely  to  correct  deviations  from  normal  quality  that  are 
‘obnoxious’ to its exit-prone customers. This may not be seen as an improvement by 
its vocal customers. Alternatively, if the organisation is more responsive to voice, it 
may work to minimise discontent among its vocal customers by changing quality in 
ways that are not appreciated by those who are exit-prone. The quality path of the 
organisation  can  therefore  be  predicted  in  different  contexts,  or  under  different 
assumptions regarding the relative responsiveness of the organisation to the different 
signals. A key point for the purposes of the current analysis is that, if quality is multi-
dimensional, exit and voice do not necessarily complement each other because exit-
prone and more vocal consumers may view the same change in quality differently 
from  one  another.  Moreover,  there  will  be  no  spillovers  between  alert  or  inalert 
consumers if they value different aspects of quality. Spillovers may be possible in a 
multi-dimensional quality setting, but only if alert and inalert similarly value quality 
changes along the same dimension. They are no longer guaranteed. 
 
Application to the English education sector 
 
The notion of multi-dimensional quality seems in tune with the actual basis for choice 
of parents. As discussed above, the  evidence suggests that the basis for choice is 
indeed  multi-dimensional;  that  parents  have  different  preferences  across  different 
dimensions  of  school  ‘quality’:  test  scores,  school  composition,  ethos,  ‘expressive 
order’, location. In this case the Hirschman analysis predicts that there is no guarantee 
that choice and voice will complement each other, nor that there will be spillovers 
between alert and inalert consumers if they value different aspects of quality. There is 
no longer any guarantee of that ‘rising tide’.  
 
Can we say anything about the likely outcome, about the ‘quality path’ schools have 
the incentive to take in this case? I argue that the notion of the pupil as a quality 
maker,  and  the  fact  that  a  centrally  published  performance  measure  of  quality 
incorporates  this,  proves  useful  in  predicting  the  outcome.  While  measures  of 
(contextual) value added are now routinely published in the secondary school league 
                                                 
12 Hirschman, for example, discusses the two-party political system in the US in this context.  10 
tables, it is still the performance measures based on raw test scores that continue to 
provide the headline figures (Wilson and Piebalga 2008). The notion of consumers as 
quality  makers  proves  relevant  to  these  ‘headline’  measures  of  quality.  More 
generally, any measure of educational outcomes which does not explicitly account for 
input includes some notion of the pupil as a quality maker
13.  
 
These raw output measures have been – and continue to be – the key indicator in the 
English school league tables. School rankings in the league tables matter to all key 
players in the education system (Wilson et al 2006). Schools have the incentive to 
care about outcomes as measured by these summary indicators of raw test scores and 
therefore have the incentive to care about – to respond to signals from – pupils of high 
ability whose exit would reduce (or entry would enhance) quality as measured by 
such indicators, which directly relates to Hirschman’s notion of consumer as a quality 
maker. Specifically, they have the incentive to respond to the parents of high ability 
children. Given the positive association between income and attainment, these are 
going to be, broadly speaking, middle class parents.  In the education  context, the 
middle class parents are likely to be the most exit-prone and the most vocal (Le Grand 
2007).  Contrary  to  Hirschman,  therefore,  there  may  not  be  a  conflict  between 
responding to (the threat of)  exit or responding to voice in the multi-dimensional 
quality  setting.  Instead,  schools  currently  have  the  incentive  to  respond  to  either 
signal  from  the  parents  whose  children  will  boost  (measured)  quality.  And  this 
incentive comes from the design of the PM system and, in particular, the importance 
of performance measures that incorporate pupils as quality makers. 
 
So  choice  and  voice  do  complement  each  other,  even  though  quality  is  multi-
dimensional, but only for one type of consumer. And schools have the incentive to 
focus on the elements of quality preferred by that type of consumer. This provides one 
way  of  thinking  about  how  to  predict  the  resultant  quality  path  followed  by  the 
school.  For  example,  one  aspect  or  dimension  of  quality  which  the  school  may 
subsequently have the incentive to change is  composition. This provides potential 
links with the debates on (covert) selection by schools (Le Grand 2007). There has 
been recent evidence that some schools in England have being breaking admissions 
laws  in  ways  which,  according  to  Schools  Minister  Jim  Knight,  penalised  poorer 
families
14.  Similarly,  a  recent  government  inquiry  found  that  17%  of  the  570 
secondary schools checked in three local authorities were breaking the admissions 
rules,  for  example  by  asking  parents  banned  questions  about  marital  status  and 




The way in which ‘quality’ is measured, and the information subsequently published, 
thus provides a central link between the top-down and bottom-up elements of reform; 
between the incentives created by the former and the information on which parents at 
least partly base their choice.  
 
                                                 
13 Propper and Wilson (2003) discuss a similar point regarding general differences between alternative 
performance measures. 
14 See http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/1/hi/education/7193052.stm (story published 17/01/2008; 
accessed 26/06/2008). 
15 See http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/1/hi/education/7326347.stm (story published 03/04/2008; 




The purpose of this paper was to go back to the original Hirschman (1970) thesis to 
relate  the  policy  discourse  of  choice  and  voice  to  his  exit-voice  distinction.  In 
particular, I scrutinised the assumption that choice and voice complement each other 
to  increase  the  quality  of  education  provision  for  all.  A  careful  analysis  of 
Hirschman’s  arguments  shows  that  the  outcomes  of  such  user-driven  mechanisms 
fundamentally depend on how quality is defined. Applying his findings to the English 
education sector suggests the following. If we think of quality as school effectiveness 
or value added, a change in that quality is felt in the same direction by all. The use of 
choice and/or voice by alert consumers improves quality for all, provided schools are 
responsive to the signal(s) employed. This is no longer necessarily the case if we 
think in terms of a multi-dimensional concept of quality. If the most exit prone and 
the  most  vocal  are  different  consumers,  choice  and  voice  may  work  in  different 
directions.  If,  however,  the  same  consumers  are  most  exit  prone  and  most  vocal, 
choice and voice may complement each other to improve quality along the dimension 
valued (possibly only) by that group. I argue that the latter is more likely to be the 
case in the education context; that it is the middle class parents who are seen as most 
likely to exercise both choice and voice. The question then is whether schools have 
the incentive to respond to either signal from this subset of parents. I argue that they 
do so, given the incentives created by the league tables and in particular the fact that 
the headline figures, based on raw test scores, incorporate the notion of the pupil as 
quality maker. This suggests that the current UK policy discourse may be misleading 
in the education context: choice and voice can work together to improve quality, but 
maybe  only  for  a  subset  of  consumers.  The  discourse  evokes  the  language  of 
Hirschman but not the actual implications of his analysis. 
 
This  analysis  further  shows  that  these  alternative  concepts  of  ‘quality’  provide  a 
useful framework for thinking about potential outcomes from combinations of the 
bottom-up and top-down elements of reform across different areas of public service 
delivery. These different concepts will be applicable in varying degrees across these 
different areas. Following from this, the current analysis represents a starting point for 
a  broader  research  programme,  both  with  regard  to  exit/voice  in  different  public 
services,  and  with  regard  to  the  other  elements  of  the  reform  program  (trust, 
capability, for example). This analysis also highlights the need for more empirical 
evidence on the basis for parental choice of school; on the correlations – positive 
and/or  negative  –  between  the  different  dimensions  of  school  quality  and,  in 
particular, between the preferences of different parents across those dimensions. This 
will inform the extent to which schools responding to one group of consumers (here, 
for  example,  the  middle  class  parents)  are  also  improving  quality  along  the 
dimensions valued by other groups, which will in turn provide evidence on the extent 
to which spillovers may in fact be possible within a multi-dimensional quality setting.  
 
My analysis has further implications for policy. First, it provides a further argument 
against the publication of school performance tables that focus on measures of quality 
based on raw outcomes, i.e. that incorporate the notion of the pupil as a quality maker. 
Removing such measures would both counteract the legitimisation of associating high 
ability intake with high quality school, and would also reduce the incentive of schools 
to only respond to the signals from that subset of consumers. This could be supported 12 
by adjustments to the funding formula for schools, such that per capita levels are 
explicitly  adjusted  across  broad  pupil  types  (Le  Grand  2007).  Second,  if  the 
government wants to introduce more options for parents to exercise voice it needs to 
ensure that the performance management system incorporates incentives for schools 
to  respond  to  that  signal  from  all  consumers  (and  to  respond  by  improving 
effectiveness). More generally, it reinforces the importance of considering the design 
of the top-down elements of reform in conjunction with the bottom-up elements, in 
order to achieve consistency between user-driven incentives and those created by the 
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